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Abstract
Adversarial training provides a principled approach for training robust neural networks.
From an optimization perspective, the adversarial training is essentially solving a minimax
robust optimization problem. The outer minimization is trying to learn a robust classifier,
while the inner maximization is trying to generate adversarial samples. Unfortunately, such a
minimax problem is very difficult to solve due to the lack of convex-concave structure. This work
proposes a new adversarial training method based on a general learning-to-learn framework.
Specifically, instead of applying the existing hand-design algorithms for the inner problem, we
learn an optimizer, which is parametrized as a convolutional neural network. At the same time,
a robust classifier is learned to defend the adversarial attack generated by the learned optimizer.
Our experiments demonstrate that our proposed method significantly outperforms existing
adversarial training methods on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
1 Introduction
This decade has witnessed great breakthroughs in deep learning in a variety of applications, such
as computer vision (Taigman et al., 2014; Girshick et al., 2014; He et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017).
Recent studies (Szegedy et al., 2013), however, show that most of these deep learning models are
very vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Specifically, by injecting a small perturbation to a normal
sample, one can obtain an adversarial example. Although the adversarial example is semantically
indistinguishable from the normal one, it can fool deep learning models and undermine the security
of deep learning, causing reliability problems in autonomous driving, biometric authentication, etc.
Researchers have devoted many efforts to studying efficient adversarial attack and defense
(Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Nguyen et al., 2015; Zheng et al., 2016; Madry
et al., 2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017). There is a growing body of work on generating adversarial
examples, e.g., fast gradient sign method (FGSM, Goodfellow et al. (2014b)), projected gradient
method (PGM, Kurakin et al. (2016)), Carlini-Wagner (CW, Paszke et al. (2017)) etc. As for defense,
Goodfellow et al. (2014b) propose to robustify the network by adversarial training, which augments
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training data with adversarial examples and still requires the network to output the correct label.
Further, Madry et al. (2017) formalize the adversarial training as the following minimax optimization
problem:
minθ
1
n
∑n
i=1
[
maxδi∈B `(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi)
]
, (1)
where {(xi , yi)}ni=1 ⊂Rd ×Y are n pairs of input feature and the corresponding label, ` denotes a loss
function, f (·;θ) denotes the neural network with parameter θ, and δi ∈ B denotes the perturbation
for xi in constraint B. The existing literature on optimization also refers to θ as the primal variable
and δi ’s as the dual variables. Different from the well-studied convex-concave problem1, problem (1)
is very challenging since ` is nonconvex in θ and nonconcave in δ. As a result, they may be many
equilibria, and majority of them are unstable. In the existing optimization literature, there is no
algorithm to converge to a stable equilibrium with theoretical guarantees. Empirically, the existing
primal-dual algorithms perform poorly for solving (1).
Minimax formulation (1) naturally provides us with a unified perspective on prior works of
adversarial training. Such a minimax problem consists of two optimization problems, an inner
maximization problem and an outer minimization problem: The inner problem targets on finding
an optimal attack for a given data point (x,y) that maximizes the loss, which essentially is the
adversarial attack; The outer problem aims to find a θ so that the loss given by the inner problem is
minimized.
For solving (1), Goodfellow et al. (2014b) propose to use FGSM to solve the inner problem.
Kurakin et al. (2016) then find that FGSM with true label provided suffer from a “label leaking”
effect, which can ruin the adversarial training. Madry et al. (2017) further suggest to solve the inner
problem by PGM and obtain a result better than FGSM, since FGSM essentially is one iteration
PGM. However, adversarial training needs to find a δi for each (xi , yi), thus the dimension of the
overall search space for all data is substantial, which makes the computation expensive.
Instead, we propose a new learning-to-learn (L2L) framework that provides a more principled
and efficient way for adversarial training. Specifically, we parameterize the optimizer of the inner
maximization problem by a neural network denoted by g(A(x,y,θ);φ), where A(x,y,θ) denotes
the input of the optimizer g. We also call the optimizer as the attacker network. Since the neural
network is very powerful in function approximation, our parameterization ensures that g is able
to yield strong adversarial perturbations. Under our framework, instead of directly solving δi , we
update the parameter φ of g. Our training procedure becomes updating the parameters of two
neural networks, which is very similar to Generative Adversarial Network (GAN, Goodfellow et al.
(2014a)).
Different from the hand-designed methods that compute the adversarial perturbation for each
individual sample using gradients from backpropagation, our methods generate the perturba-
tions for all samples through the shared attacker g. This enables g to learn potential common
structures of the perturbations. Therefore, our method is capable of yielding strong perturbations
1Loss function `(θ;δ) is convex in primal variable θ and concave in dual variable δ.
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and accelerating the training process. Furthermore, L2L framework is very flexible: we can either
choose different inputA(x,y,θ), or use different attacker architectures. For example, we can include
gradient information in A(x,y,θ) and use a recurrent neural network (RNN) to mimic multi-step
gradient-type methods. Instead of simply computing the high order information with finite differ-
ence approximation or multiple gradients, by parameterizing the algorithm as a neural network,
our proposed methods can capture this information in a much smarter way (Finn et al., 2017). Our
experiments demonstrate that our proposed methods not only significantly outperform existing
adversarial training methods, e.g., FGSM training, but also enjoy the computational efficiency over
CIFAR and SVHN datasets (Netzer et al., 2011; Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009).
The research on L2L has a long history (Schmidhuber, 1987, 1992, 1993; Younger et al., 2001;
Hochreiter et al., 2001; Andrychowicz et al., 2016). The basic idea is that one first models the updating
formula of complicated optimization algorithms in a parametric form, and then uses some simple
algorithms, e.g., stochastic gradient algorithm to learn the parameter of the optimizer. Among
existing works, Hochreiter et al. (2001) propose a system allowing the output of backpropagation
from one network to feed into an additional learning network, with both networks trained jointly;
Based on this, Andrychowicz et al. (2016) further show that the design of an optimization algorithm
can be cast as a learning problem. Specifically, they use long short-term memory RNNs to model
the algorithm and allow the RNNs to exploit structure in the problems of interest in an automatic
way, which is undoubtedly one of the most popular methods for learning-to-learn.
However, there are two major drawbacks of the existing L2L methods: (1) It requires a large
amount of datasets (or a large number of tasks in multi-task learning) to guarantee the learned
optimizer to generalize, which significantly limits their applicability (most of the related works only
consider the image encoding as the motivating application); (2) The number of layers/iterations
in RNN for modeling algorithms cannot be large to avoid significant computational burden in
backpropagation.
Our contribution is that we fill the blank of the learning-to-learn framework in solving minimax
problem, and our proposed methods do not suffer from the aforementioned drawbacks: (1) The
attacker network g with a different φ essentially generates a different task/dataset. Therefore, for
adversarial training, we have sufficiently many tasks for learning-to-learn; (2) The inner problem
does not need a large scale RNN, and we use a convolutional neural network (CNN) or a length-two
RNN (sequence of length 2) as our attacker network, which eases the computation.
Our work is also related to GAN and dual-embedding (Goodfellow et al., 2014a; Dai et al., 2016).
All these solve minimax problems and share some common ground. We discuss these works in
Section 4.
Notations. Given a ∈R, denote (a)+ as max(a,0). Given x,y ∈Rd , denote xi as the i-th element of x,
||x||∞ =maxi |xi | as `∞-norm of x, and x ◦ y = [x1y1, · · · ,xdyd]> as element-wise product.
3
2 Method
This paper focuses on `∞-norm attack. We define the `∞-ball with radius  by B() = {δ ∈ Rd :
||δ||∞ ≤ } and the corresponding projection as follows:
ΠB()(δ) = sign(δ) ◦max(|δ|,),
where sign and max are element-wise operators.
2.1 Adversarial Training
The goal of adversarial training is to robustify neural networks. Recall that from a robust opti-
mization perspective, given n samples {(xi , yi)}ni=1, where xi is the i-th feature vector and yi is the
corresponding label, adversarial training is reformulated as the following optimization problem (1):
minθ
1
n
∑n
i=1
[
maxδi∈B `(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi)
]
,
where f denotes the network with parameter θ, ` denotes a loss function, and  is the maximum
perturbation magnitude.
We first demonstrate the hardness of solving problem (1). Ideally, we want to obtain the optimal
solution for the inner problem
δ∗i := argmaxδi∈B `(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi).
However, note that the loss function `(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi) is highly nonconcave in δi . Therefore, in
reality the δi we obtained is very unlikely to be the optimum δ∗i . This then often leads to a highly
unreliable or even completely wrong search direction, e.g.,
〈∇θ`(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi),∇θ`(f (xi + δ∗i ;θ), yi)〉 < 0,
which may further results in a limiting cycle shown in Figure 1. This becomes even worse when
sample noises exist.
Figure 1: Illustration for the hardness of problem (1). A wrong descent direction leads to a limiting
cycle and algorithms fail to converge.
4
Algorithm 1 Standard pipeline of adversarial training
Input: {(xi , yi)}ni=1: clean data, α: step size, N : number of epochs, : maximum perturbation
magnitude.
Return: θ: parameter of classifier f .
for t← 1 to N do
Sample a minibatchMt
for i inMt do
δi ← argmaxδi∈B() `(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi)
Generate adversarial perturbation for (xi , yi)
θ← θ −α 1|Mt |
∑
i∈Mt ∇θ`(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi)
Update θ over adversarial data {(xi + δi , yi)}i∈Mt
In the existing literature, the standard pipeline of adversarial training is shown in Algorithm 1.
Since the step of generating adversarial perturbation δi in Algorithm 1 is intractable, most adversarial
training methods adopt hand-designed algorithms. For example, Kurakin et al. (2016) propose
to solve the inner problem approximately by first order methods such as PGM. Specifically, PGM
iteratively updates the adversarial perturbation by projected sign gradient ascent method for each
sample: Given one sample (xi , yi), at the t-th iteration, PGM takes
δti ←ΠB()
(
δt−1i + η · sign
(
∇x`(f (x˜ti ;θ), y)
))
, (2)
where x˜ti = xi + δ
t−1
i , η is the step size, T is a pre-defined total number of iterations, and δ
0
i = 0,
t = 1, · · · ,T . Finally PGM takes δi = δTi . Note that FGSM essentially is one-iteration PGM. Besides,
some works adopt other optimization methods, such as momentum gradient method (Dong et al.,
2018), and L-BFGS (Tabacof and Valle, 2016). However, except for FGSM, all require numerous
queries for gradients through backpropagation, which is computationally expensive.
2.2 Learning to Defense by Learning to Attack (L2L)
OptimizerClassifier
x
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Figure 2: An illustration of L2L. We learn a neural network to model the algorithm for generating
adversarial attack.
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Since the objective function is nonconvex-nonconcave, there is no guarantee for hand-designed
methods to perform well. Instead, we propose to learn an optimizer for the inner problem. Specifi-
cally, we parameterize the attacker by a Neural Network g(A(x,y,θ);φ), where A(x,y,θ), the input
of the network g, summaries the information of data and neural network f (·;θ). We then convert
problem (1) to
minθ
1
n
∑n
i=1
[
`(f (xi + g(A(xi , yi ,θ);φ∗);θ), yi)
]
, (3)
where φ∗ is defined as the solution to the following optimization problem:
φ∗ ∈argmax
φ
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(f (xi + g(A(xi , yi ,θ);φ);θ), yi)
subject to g(A(x,y,θ);φ) ∈ B().
Solving problem (3) naturally consists of two stages. In the first stage, the classifier f aims to fit
over all perturbed data; While in the second stage, given a certain f obtained in the first stage, the
attacker network g targets on generating optimal perturbations under constraints δi ’s ∈ B().
Algorithm 2 Learning-to-learn-based adversarial training with gradient attacker network
Input: {(xi , yi)}ni=1: clean data, α1,α2: step sizes, N : number of epochs, : maximum perturbation
magnitude.
Return: θ: parameter of classifier f ; φ: parameter of attacker g.
for t← 1 to N do
Sample a minibatchMt
for i inMt do
ui ← 1|Mt |
∑
i∈Mt ∇x`(f (xi ;θ), yi)
δi ← g(xi ,ui ;φ)
Generate perturbation by g
θ← θ −α1 1|Mt |
∑
i∈Mt ∇θ`(f (xi + δi ;θ), yi)
Update θ over adversarial data {(xi + δi , yi)}i∈Mt
φ← φ+α2 1|Mt |
∑
i∈Mt ∇φ`(f (xi + δiθ), yi)
Update φ over adversarial data {(xi + δi , yi)}i∈Mt
Since δi = g(A(xi , yi ;θ);φ), constraints can be simply handled by a tanh activation function in
the last layer of g. Specifically, because the magnitude of tanh output is bounded by 1, after we
rescale the output by , the output of g automatically satisfies the constraints.
This framework is very flexible. We can choose different A(x,y,θ) as the input and also mimic
multi-step gradient algorithms shown in Figure 2. Here we provide the following three examples:
Naive Attacker Network. This is the simplest example among our methods, taking the original
image xi as the input, i.e.,
A(xi , yi ,θ) = xi and δi = g(xi ;φ).
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Under this setting, L2L training is similar to GAN training. The major difference is that the generator
in GAN yields synthetic data by transforming random noises, while the naive attacker network
generates perturbations by transforming training samples.
Original 
Input
Classifier f
Gradient
w.r.t. Clean Loss
Perturbation
Perturbed
Input
Clean Loss
Adv. Loss
+
Backprop
Concatenate
Attacker g
1st pass
2nd pass
3rd pass
Figure 3: The architecture of L2L adversarial training with gradient attacker network.
Gradient Attacker Network. Motivated by hand-designed methods, e.g., FGSM, we design an
attacker which takes the gradient information into computation. Specifically, we concatenate image
xi and gradient ∇x`(f (xi ;θ), yi) from backpropagation as the input of g, i.e.,
A(xi , yi ,θ) =
[
xi ,∇x`(f (xi ;θ), yi)
]
and δi = g
(
xi ,∇x`(f (xi ;θ), yi);φ
)
.
Since more information is provided, we expect the attacker network to be more efficient to learn
and yield more powerful perturbations.
Multi-Step Gradient Attacker Network. We adapt the RNN to mimic a multi-step gradient update.
Specifically, we use the gradient attacker network as the cell of RNN sharing the same parameter
φ. As we mentioned earlier, the number of layers/iterations in the RNN for modeling algorithms
cannot be very large so as to avoid significant computational burden in backpropagation. In this
paper, we focus on a length-two RNN to mimic a two-step gradient update. The corresponding
perturbation becomes:
δi =ΠB()
(
δ
(0)
i + g
(
x˜i ,∇x`(f (x˜i , yi ;θ);φ
))
,
where x˜i = xi + δ
(0)
i and δ
(0)
i = g
(
xi ,∇x`(f (xi , yi ;θ);φ
)
.
7
Taking gradient attacker network as an example, Figure 3 illustrates how L2L works and jointly
trains two networks: The first forward pass is used to obtain gradient of the classification loss over
clean data; The second forward pass is used to generate perturbation δi by attacker g; The third
forward pass is used to calculate the adversarial loss ` in (3). Since our gradient attacker network
only needs one backpropagation to query gradient, it amortizes the adversarial training cost, which
leads to better computational efficiency. Moreover, L2L may adapt to the underlying optimization
problem and yield better solution for the inner problem. The corresponding procedure of L2L is
shown in Algorithm 2.
3 Experiments
To demonstrate the effectiveness and computational efficiency of our methods, we compare our
methods with FGSM and PGM training over CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN datasets, and
evaluate the robustness of models under both white-box and black-box settings. All experiments
are done in PyTorch with one NVIDIA 1080 Ti GPU. We choose hyper-parameters by grid search.
For simplicity, we denote Plain Net as the classifier network trained over clean data only, FGSM
Net and PGM Nets as the classifiers with FGSM training and PGM training respectively, and
Naive L2L, Grad L2L, and 2-Step L2L as classifiers using L2L training with corresponding attacker
networks.
3.1 General Setting
Classifier Network. All experiments adopt a 32-layer Wide Residual Network (WRN-4-32, Zagoruyko
and Komodakis (2016)) as the classifier network. A pre-trained Plain Net is used as the initial classi-
fier in the adversarial training. For training a Plain Net over SVHN dataset, we use the stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) algorithm with Polyak’s momentum (parameter 0.9) and choose the step size
as 0.1 for 160 epochs. Plain Nets for CIFAR datasets are obtained by the same training procedure
as Zagoruyko and Komodakis (2016). We use cross entropy as the loss function.
Attacker Network. We investigate two attacker architectures: slim and wide shown in Tables 1.
In the slim network, the second convolutional layer uses downsampling, while the second last
deconvolutional layer uses upsampling. On the opposite, the wide network keeps the size of
intermediate tensors as the original input is. Although the slim network is computationally cheap,
due to the downsampling, it loses some information of input. Thus, inspired by residual learning
in He et al. (2016), we use a skip layer connection to ease the training of the slim network. Specifically,
the last layer takes the concatenation of A(x,y,θ) and the output of the second last layer as input.
White-box and Black-box. Under the white-box setting, attackers can access all parameters of
target models and generate adversarial examples based on the models; While under the black-box
setting, accessing parameters is prohibited. Therefore, we adopt the standard transfer attack method
from Liu et al. (2016). Due to the space limit, we leave results of the black-box setting in Appendix A.
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Table 1: Attacker Network Architectures. k,c, s,p denote the kernel size, output channels, stride and padding
of the convolutional layers. Batch Normalization (BN) and ReLU activation are applied when specified.
ResBlocks use the same structure as the generator in Miyato et al. (2018).
Slim Attacker Network Architecture Wide Attacker Network Architecture
Conv: [k = 3× 3, c = 128, s = 1,p = 1], Conv: [k = 3× 3, c = 64, s = 1,p = 1],
BN+ReLU BN+ReLU
ResBlocks: [channel = 256] ResBlocks: [channel = 128]
ResBlocks: [channel = 128], BN ResBlocks: [channel = 256]
DeConv: [k = 4× 4, c = 16, s = 2,p = 1], ResBlocks: [channel = 128]
BN+ReLU
Conv: [k = 3× 3, c = 3, s = 1,p = 1], tanh ResBlocks: [channel = 64]
Conv: [k = 3× 3, c = 3, s = 1,p = 1], tanh
PGM Attack. We use a 10-iteration PGM with a step size η = 0.01. Moreover, for training PGM
Nets, we use different numbers of iterations PGMs, i.e., PGM-3, PGM-10, and PGM-20 Nets.
CW Attack. Here, we briefly describe the CW attack under our setting. Given one sample x and its
corresponding label y, CW attack solves the following optimization problem:
δ∗ = argminδ∈B() ||δ||∞ + c ·maxt,y
(
(f (x+ δ)t − f (x+ δ)y)+
)
, (4)
where c is a tuning parameter. CW attack aims to find the-least norm perturbation that can fool
classifier f by penalizing those correctly classified perturbed data x+ δ. To solve (4), we adopt the
update rule in Paszke et al. (2017), and set the number of iterations as 100. c is automatically tuned
by the update rule. For each sample, our algorithm starts at 0 and stops either the perturbation
successfully fools the classifier, or the maximum number of iterations is reached.We empirically
find out that the results of CW attack are similar to those of PGM attack. Therefore, we only do
PGM training due to the high computational cost of CW attack.
Robustness Evaluation. We evaluate the robustness of neural networks by FGSM, PGM, and CW
attacks. All reported white-box setting results are averaged over 5 runs with different random
seeds. For the perturbation magnitude, we set  as 0.03 (after rescaling the pixels to [0,1]) over
CIFAR datasets, and 0.05 over SVHN. Moreover, for CIFAR-10, we also evaluate the robustness by
taking different number of iterations for PGM attack with  = 0.03 shown in Figure 4 and different
perturbation magnitudes shown in Figure 5.
3.2 CIFAR Datasets
L2L. To update classifier’s parameter θ, we use SGD algorithm with Polyak’s momentum (parameter
0.9) and weight decay (parameter 10−4). We set step size as 0.1 for the first 30 epochs and 0.01
for the next 10 epochs. Since we start with a pretrained Plain Net, 40 epochs are sufficient for the
adversarial training to converge. We use the same configuration to update attacker’s parameter φ.
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FGSM Net and PGM Net. We use the SGD algorithm to update θ for FGSM and PGM training.
Different from L2L using step size annealing, here we use a fixed step size 0.01, since we find
that step size annealing procedure hurts both FGSM and PGM training. Besides updating θ over
adversarial samples, we also update θ over clean data for keeping the accuracy on clean data as
Kurakin et al. (2016) suggests. Without this trick, the accuracy over clean drops significantly for
PGM Net and FGSM Net. Moreover, for PGM Nets, we use a step size η = 0.01 in (2), which yields
sufficiently strong perturbations in practice.
Table 2: Results under white-box setting over CIFAR. (W) denotes the wide attacker network; (S) denotes the
slim attacker network. Standard deviations are presented in brackets.
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Clean FGSM PGM10 CW Clean FGSM PGM10 CW
Plain Net 94.49 23.51 0.00 0.00 76.10 9.49 0.13 0.00
(0.49) (5.15) – – (0.58) (0.44) (0.06) –
FGSM Net 92.44 76.25 2.90 0.18 69.39 52.98 0.68 0.00
(0.83) (7.87) (1.26) (0.14) (1.97) (4.46) (0.13) –
PGM-3 Net 86.04 52.04 39.42 45.58 60.18 22.95 16.14 20.28
(0.73) (2.01) (0.72) (0.20) (0.40) (0.08) (0.18) (0.14)
PGM-10 Net 85.92 52.25 40.69 50.62 61.65 24.64 19.46 22.43
(0.62) (1.20) (0.64) (0.56) (1.71) (0.44) (0.31) (0.31)
PGM-20 Net 85.8 51.5 45.26 50.62 61.88 24.79 19.43 22.25
(0.67) (1.0) (0.52) (0.27) (0.86) (0.35) (0.21) (0.53)
Naive L2L (S) 94.41 28.44 0.01 0.00 75.27 8.47 0.05 0.00
(0.45) (9.64) – – (0.50) (0.27) (0.01) –
Grad L2L (S) 85.31 57.44 53.42 42.72 60.60 26.58 27.77 23.14
(0.45) (2.53) (1.07) 5.68 (0.13) (0.77) (0.34) (0.61)
2-Step L2L (S) 75.36 60.19 46.42 40.82 60.23 25.92 20.63 22.70
(0.08) (0.89) (1.36) (2.89) (0.21) (0.27) (0.49) (0.92)
Naive L2L (W) 88.26 13.80 0.00 0.02 63.52 5.86 0.26 0.03
(0.85) (1.64) – – (0.26) (0.25) (0.08) –
Grad L2L (W) 86.92 60.42 47.90 53.15 62.43 34.23 25.92 28.38
(0.35) (1.13) (0.46) (0.58) (0.20) (0.32) (0.31) 0.20
2-Step L2L (W) 71.65 56.14 51.47 49.92 61.44 32.30 29.63 30.29
(0.70) (0.59) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.52) (0.50) (0.54)
Table 2 shows results of all methods over CIFAR datasets under the white-box setting 2. As can
be seen, Grad L2L, and 2-Step L2L with slim attackers have comparable performances as PGM Nets,
and Grad/2-step L2L with wide attackers significantly outperforms PGM Nets over CIFAR-100.
However, without gradient information, Naive L2L is vulnerable to all attacks. For FGSM attack,
FGSM Net achieves the highest accuracy due to label leaking issue (Kurakin et al., 2016).
2Our results of PGM Nets over CIFAR-10 match the results in Madry et al. (2017). For low accuracy and CW attack,
we do not present the standard deviation.
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Table 3: Running time for one epoch over CIFAR-10 (1st Row) and CIFAR-100 (2nd Row). (Unit : s)
Plain Net FGSM Net PGM-3 Net PGM-10 Net PGM-20 Net
35.90± 0.15 104.00±0.20 172.11± 0.19 411.17± 0.45 751.06± 0.69
35.88± 0.15 104.35±0.13 195.36± 0.38 412.85± 0.30 855.74± 3.14
Naive L2L (S) Grad L2L (S) 2-Step L2L (S) Naive L2L (W) Grad L2L (W) 2-Step L2L (W)
124.24± 0.17 126.23±0.12 207.44± 0.35 190.64± 0.33 189.89± 0.65 308.25± 0.23
124.33± 0.26 137.96±0.31 207.61± 0.34 189.96± 0.96 189.41± 0.82 331.08± 2.44
Table 3 shows the running time of all methods for one epoch over CIFAR-10. As can be seen,
Grad L2L is comparable with FGSM Net and PGM-3 Net. 2-Step L2L is slower than Grad L2L, but
faster than PGM-10 Net and PGM-20 Net. By further comparing the accuracy of Grad/2-Step L2L
and PGM Nets from Table 2, we find that L2L enjoys computational efficiency.
Besides, Figures 4 and 5 present the accuracy against FGSM and PGM attacks with different
perturbation magnitudes and different number of iterations. As can be seen, Grad L2L is more
robust than PGM Net; Both Grad L2L (S) and (W) outperform FGSM and PGM Nets.
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Figure 4: The accuracy against PGM attack over CIFAR-10 with different number of iterations and  = 0.03.
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Figure 5: Illustrative examples of performances with different perturbation magnitudes over CIFAR-10 under
FGSM and PGM attacks. Left figures show the accuracy over perturbed examples; Right figures show the
difference between Grad L2L and PGM Net (treating PGM Net results as the base).
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3.3 SVHN Dataset
L2L. To update θ, we use the Adam algorithm (parameters β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.99) and weight decay
(parameter 10−4) (Kingma and Ba, 2014). We set the step size as 2× 10−4 for the first 30 epochs and
2× 10−5 for the next 10 epochs. We train models for 40 epochs, which is the same as the training
progress of CIFAR. We also use the Adam algorithm to update the attacker’s parameter φ with the
same hyper-parameters, but a fixed step size 10−3.
Table 4: Results under white-box setting over SVHN. Standard deviations are presented in brackets.
Clean FGSM PGM10 CW
Plain Net 96.11 19.62 0.05 0.07
(0.08) (2.07) (0.03) (0.05)
FGSM Net 93.60 93.03 0.16 0
(1.12) (3.00) – –
PGM-3 Net 95.90 36.05 19.03 13.84
(0.24) (2.27) (1.27) (0.70)
PGM-10 Net 89.98 50.93 31.98 31.70
(1.14) (0.96) (0.79) (0.43)
Naive L2L (S) 93.87 61.33 0.00 0.00
(0.77) (4.13) – –
Grad L2L (S) 87.97 45.24 26.84 12.23
(0.20) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29)
2-Step L2L (S) 91.17 70.05 47.58 24.98
(0.27) (0.68) (0.52) (1.16)
Naive L2L (W) 96.53 49.31 0.05 0.00
(0.09) (2.53) (0.04) –
Grad L2L (W) 92.62 79.52 35.63 4.43
(0.36) (0.61) (2.28) (0.55)
2-Step L2L (W) 88.69 62.70 44.44 27.98
(0.94) (1.66) (0.98) (1.13)
Table 4 presents the results under white-box setting over SVHN. Again, FGSM Net achieves
highest accuracy against FGSM attack. 2-Step L2Ls significantly outperforms the PGM Nets against
PGM10 attack. Moreover, 2-Step L2L with wide attacker has comparable performance as PGM-10
training against CW attack.
3.4 Visualizing Adversarial Examples
We present three illustrative adversarial examples of different models. Figure 6 shows the FGSM
and PGM perturbations of FGSM Net, PGM Net, and Grad L2L.
For the airplane and the apple, all three networks defense FGSM attack successfully; While only
FGSM Nets are fooled by PGM attack. As can be seen, FGSM perturbations of three networks over
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Figure 6: Illustrative examples of FGSM and PGM attacks for FGSM Net, PGM Net, and Grad L2L. Images
in top three layers are from FGSM attack; Those in bottom three layers are from PGM attack.
the airplane are similar, and a similar phenomenon happens for the perturbations of the apple.
The corresponding PGM perturbations, however, are very different: PGM perturbations of FGSM
Net are so scattered that they look like random noises; While for PGM Net and Grad L2L, the
perturbations still have certain patterns and we are able to recognize their shapes. As can be seen,
PGM perturbation of Grad L2L is similar with that of the PGM Net. This further supports our
conjecture that the attacker in Grad L2L is able to learn some high order information with one step
gradient information.
For digit “5”, all three networks defense FGSM attack successfully; While only Grad L2L defenses
PGM attack. FGSM Net and PGM Net recognize their corresponding PGM adversarial examples as
“6” and “1” respectively. As can be seen, a maximum perturbation magnitude of 0.05 for this simple
dataset is large enough to generate adversarial samples to fool human beings. For example, the
perturbed data of PGM attack on FGSM Net in Figure 6 is recognized as “6” by human. Moreover,
the PGM perturbation of Grad L2L, however, is less destructive such that both human and Grad
L2L can correctly classify the perturbed data. In this case, Grad L2L successfully learns to defense
by making the gradient less informative, i.e., making gradient obfuscated Athalye et al. (2018).
4 Discussions
We first discuss a few benefits of our neural network approach:
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(1) Since the neural network has been known to be powerful in function approximation, Our
attacker network g can yield strong adversarial perturbations. They are generated by the
same attacker. Therefore, the attacker g essentially learns some common structures across all
samples;
(2) The attacker networks in our experiments are actually overparametrized, which has been
conjectured to ease the training of deep neural networks. We believe that similar phenomena
happen to our attacker network, and ease the adversarial training.
We then discuss a few closely related works:
• By leveraging the Fenchel duality and feature embedding technique, Dai et al. (2016) convert a
learning conditional distribution problem to a minimax problem, which is similar to naive attacker
network. Both approaches, however, lack the primal information. In contrast, gradient attacker
network considers the gradient information of primal variables, and achieves good results.
• Goodfellow et al. (2014a) propose the GAN, which is very similar to our L2L framework. Both
GAN and L2L contain one generator network and one classifier network, and jointly train these two
networks. There are two major difference between GAN and our framework:
(1) GAN aims to transform the random noises to the synthetic data which is similar to the
training examples, while ours targets on transforming the training examples to the adversarial
examples for robustifying the classifier;
(2) Our generator network does not only take the training examples (analogous to the random
noise in GAN) as the input, but also exploits the gradient information of the objective function,
since it essentially represents an optimization algorithm.
The training procedure of these two, however, are quite similar. We adopt some tricks from GAN
training to our framework to stabilize the training process. For example, in Grad L2L training over
SVHN, we adopt the two-time scale trick (Heusel et al., 2017).
• There are some other works simply combining the GAN framework and adversarial training
together. For example, Baluja and Fischer (2017) and Xiao et al. (2018) propose some ad hoc GAN-
based methods to robustify neural networks. Specifically, for generating adversarial examples, they
only take training examples as the input of the generator, which lacks the information of the outer
mimnimization problem. Instead, our proposed L2L methods (e.g., Grad L2L, 2-step L2L) connect
outer and inner problems by delivering the gradient information of the objective function to the
generator. This is a very important reason for our performance gain on the benchmark datasets. As
a result, the aforementioned GAN-based methods are only robust to simple attacks, e.g., FGSM, on
simple data sets, e.g., MNIST, but fail for strong attacks, e.g., PGM and CW, on complicated data
sets, e.g. CIFAR, where our L2L methods achieve significantly better performance.
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5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a L2L framework to solve the adversarial training, which is a minimax opti-
mization problem. Instead of applying the hand-designed algorithms for the inner problem, we
learn an attacker parametrized as a neural network. Our numerical results show that our proposed
methods improve the robustness of neural networks by a margin and enjoy the computational
efficiency.
We remark that nonconvex-nonconcave minimax problems are notorious for their difficulty,
and most of existing algorithms are heuristic and ad hoc. Our proposed L2L framework is well
structured and can be generalized to solve more complicated minimax problems. Taking our results
as a start, we expect more principled and stronger follow-up work that applies L2L to solve the
minimax problem.
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Appendix
A Black-box Attack
Under the black-box setting, we first train a surrogate model with the same architecture of the target
model but with a different random seed, and then attackers generate adversarial examples to attack
the target model by querying gradients from the surrogate model.
The black-box attack highly relies on the transferability, which is the property that the adversarial
examples of one model are likely to fool others. However, the transferred attack is very unstable,
and often has a large variation in its effectiveness. Therefore, results of the black-box setting might
not be reliable and effective. Thus we only test the robustness for the slim attack network and
present one result here to demonstrate the robustness of different models.
Table 5: Results under black-box setting over CIFAR-10. (S) denotes the slim attacker network.
Surrogate Plain Net FGSM Net PGM Net
FGSM PGM10 FGSM PGM10 FGSM PGM10
Plain Net 40.03 5.60 74.42 75.25 67.37 65.92
FGSM Net 79.20 85.02 89.90 80.40 64.28 63.89
PGM Net 83.80 84.73 84.33 85.29 67.05 65.54
Naive L2L (S) 45.52 25.95 83.99 77.94 68.14 67.13
Grad L2L (S) 86.10 86.87 87.93 88.01 71.15 69.95
2-Step L2L (S) 85.83 87.10 86.51 87.60 70.58 69.38
Table 6: Results under black-box setting over CIFAR-100. (S) denotes the slim attacker network.
Surrogate Plain Net FGSM Net PGM Net
FGSM PGM10 FGSM PGM10 FGSM PGM10
Plain Net 21.04 9.04 50.57 54.06 40.06 41.30
FGSM Net 42.87 50.73 61.68 44.70 39.34 40.08
PGM Net 56.63 58.34 56.99 57.97 40.19 39.87
Naive L2L (S) 20.97 10.47 50.36 54.07 38.63 39.91
Grad L2L (S) 57.63 59.62 59.18 61.26 41.71 41.15
2-Step L2L (S) 58.66 59.31 58.92 59.46 45.80 45.31
18
Table 7: Results under black-box setting on SVHN. (S) denotes the slim attacker network.
Surrogate Plain Net FGSM Net PGM Net
FGSM PGM10 FGSM PGM10 FGSM PGM10
Plain Net 21.72 6.94 41.81 33.13 56.77 49.41
FGSM Net 57.36 51.54 56.25 38.11 55.99 48.96
PGM Net 81.04 81.52 78.66 80.42 54.85 49.21
Naive L2L (S) 73.02 42.14 78.11 59.79 85.31 61.08
Grad L2L (S) 71.74 74.31 77.19 80.70 71.99 58.71
2-Step L2L (S) 65.78 74.07 76.13 82.80 61.69 54.13
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